Non-informational access

Liz, Manuel
 Incorporated contributions
Liz (08/11/09)
 Usage domain
philosophy of mind, cognition
access non informational
 German nicht informative Zugang

A non-informational access is an access that is not informational. Non-informational access may be physical or experiential. In that sense, informational access is in contrast both with physical access and with experiential –or qualitative- access. To have informational access to a certain amount of money is not the same as to have physical access to that amount of money. To have informational access to a certain state of pain is not the same as having an experiential access to that state of pain.

Of course, we can elaborate theories about information according to which information is identified with certain physical states or properties. In addition, we can elaborate theories about experience according to which experience is identified with some sorts of informational states. However, examples as the above presented show that such identifications will always have very strong ontological commitments. Informational relations seem to be very different from physical relations, and very different too from qualitative, experiential or fenomenological relations. 

  • CHURCHLAND, Paul (1984) Matter and Consciousness. A Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge, MIT Press.
  • DRETSKE, F. (1980) Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge, MIT Press.
  •  (1988) Explaining Behaviour. Reasons in a World of Causes, Cambridge, MIT Press.
  •  (1997) Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, MIT Press.
  • FLORIDI, L. (ed.) (2004) The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Computing and Information, London, Blackwell.
  • KIM, J. (1996) Philosophy of Mind, Oxford, Westview Press.
  • MCLAUGHLIN, B. (ed.) (1991) Dretske and his Critics, Cambridge, Blackwell.
  • SEARLE, J. (1983) Intentionality. An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press.
  •  (1992) The Rediscovery of Mind, Cambridge, The MIT Press.
  • TYE, M. (1995) Ten Problems of Consciousness. A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind, Cambridge, MIT Press.
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Manuel Liz (8/11/2009)
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